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ARTICLE

Take it to the Limit: The Illegal Regulation
Prohibiting the Take of Any Threatened
Species Under the Endangered Species Act
JONATHAN WOOD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In adopting the Endangered Species Act, Congress sought to
cure two shortcomings of its prior efforts to protect species. First,
it addressed the lack of protection for species until they reached a
dire state by establishing two categories of species, endangered
and threatened.1 Threatened species—the new category—are not
imminently at risk of going extinct, but are likely to become
endangered in the foreseeable future.2 To prevent that, the
statute requires government agencies to proactively protect these
species while exercising their existing powers.3
Second, the statute added additional protection for those
species most at risk by forbidding private activity that harms any
member of an endangered species, which the statute refers to as
“take.”4 Congress expressly limited this burdensome prohibition
to endangered species.5 Private activity affecting threatened
species is left unregulated, unless the agencies charged with
implementing the statute deem it necessary and advisable to
* Jonathan Wood is a Staff Attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation. Damien
M. Schiff, Luke Wake, Wencong Fa and Ethan Blevins deserve thanks for
helpful insight, comments, and edits.
1. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2012).
2. See id. § 1532(6), (20).
3. See id. § 1536(a)–(b).
4. Id. §§ 1532(19), 1538(a).
5. See id. § 1538(a)(1).
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adopt regulations to extend the prohibition to a particular
species.6
Rather than respecting Congress’ policy choice, the agencies
adopted a regulation broadly prohibiting the take of any
threatened species.7 Turning the statutory standard on its head,
they only reduce burdens on private activity if an exemption is
necessary and advisable for the conservation of the species.8 This
approach conflicts with the statute’s text, legislative history, and
canons of statutory interpretation.
The only court to consider the regulation’s legality upheld it,
relying on Chevron. But this decision was in error. The
interpretation is ineligible for Chevron deference and contrary to
the statute. To uphold the regulation, the D.C. Circuit deferred to
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s argument that Section 4(d) of
the Endangered Species Act permits it to broadly forbid the take
of threatened species subject to no limitations or standards
whatsoever. This interpretation is not only contrary to the text of
the Endangered Species Act but, since it allows the Service to
ignore the burdens imposed on property owners, also
unreasonable.9
Part II of this article will provide a brief background on the
adoption of the Endangered Species Act. Part III will explain that
the statute does not authorize the agencies to extend the take
prohibition to all threatened species. Part IV will argue that
returning to the statutory scheme would result in a fairer
distribution of the costs of species protection by imposing the
costs of prophylactic protection on agencies and the public
generally. Burdening individuals would be a last resort, as
Congress intended. Finally, Part V will identify how Congress’
policy is a reasonable way to align private incentives with species
protection. The statute’s approach would encourage property
owners to stop a threatened species’ further slide, to avoid
imposition of the take prohibition, and to recover endangered
species to the point where they can be downlisted and the take
6. See id. § 1533(d).
7. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2015).
8. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revising the
Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,158, 46,159
(Aug. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
9. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2717 (2015).
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prohibition lifted. This would make the statute more effective at
accomplishing its primary goal – recovering species to the point
that they no longer require protection.
II.

FEDERAL EFFORTS TO CURB SPECIES
EXTINCTION

The federal government’s role in protecting wildlife has
increased along with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the
Commerce Clause power.10 Initially, federal regulation of wildlife
was limited to facilitating enforcement of state law. The Lacey
Act, for instance, prohibited the transportation in interstate
commerce of fish or wildlife taken in violation of state or foreign
laws.11 With the adoption of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act in
1918, the federal government took a more active role in protecting
particular species that raised both interstate and international
issues.12 Other early federal efforts protected wildlife on federal
property.13

10. Historically, the federal role was sharply limited. In 1896, the Supreme
Court held that states have primary responsibility for protecting wildlife,
relying on ferae naturae—the concept of state ownership of wildlife. See Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 527–28 (1896). For decades, Geer was understood to
give the states exclusive power over wildlife except in narrow circumstances
implicating federal authority. See William S. Boyd, Note, Federal Protection of
Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1303 (1970); cf. Randy E.
Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance
Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 587–603 (2010)
(explaining the Commerce Clause’s evolution through the New Deal and the
Rehnquist court).
11. See Lacey Act of 1900, ch. 552–53, 31 Stat. 187, (1900) (partially
codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 667e, 701 (1904)) (§ 667e repealed 1981); see also Black
Bass Act of 1926, ch. 346, 44 Stat. 576 (1926) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 851-56
(1928)) (repealed 1981).
12. See Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–12 (2012)); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 434–35 (1920). Congress also adopted a statute to specifically protect the
bald eagle. Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 278, 54 Stat. 250 (1940); see Ronald J.
Mazzucco, Note, Federal and State Protection Against Commercial Exploitation
of Endangered Wildlife, 17 CATH. LAW. 241, 244 (1971).
13. See e.g., Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (1965) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460l-4–460l-11
(2012)).
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The first major federal statute protecting endangered species
generally was the Endangered Species Act of 1966.14 This statute
authorized the federal government to purchase land to conserve
and propagate endangered species.15 To this, the Endangered
Species Conservation Act of 1969 added a prohibition against the
importation of certain endangered species and the transportation
or sale of wildlife taken in violation of federal, state, or foreign
law.16 These enactments were “‘the most comprehensive of [their]
type to be enacted by any nation’” up to that time.17
However, by 1973, many thought that the problem required a
more aggressive approach. In his State of the Union address,
President Nixon proposed protecting species before they become
endangered and federal regulation of private activities that affect
them once they do.18 Representative John Dingell, the author of
the bill that would ultimately become the Endangered Species
Act, had the same concerns. He explained that the chief defect of
prior efforts was the failure to protect species that “are being
heavily exploited and are in trouble, but are not yet on the brink
of extinction.”19 Many other members of the House and Senate
14. Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926
(1966) (repealed 1973).
15. See George Cameron Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An
Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REV. 315, 317 (1975)
(describing the federal precursors to the Endangered Species Act of 1973).
16. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83
Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973); see Mazzucco, supra note 13, at 245–50
(summarizing the provisions of the Endangered Species Conservation Act of
1969).
17. See Tenn.Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978) (quoting
Hearings on Endangered Species Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries & Wildlife
Conservation & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 93d
Cong. 202 (1973) (statement of Nathanal P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the
Interior)).
18. “The limited scope of existing laws requires new authority to identify
and protect endangered species before they are so depleted that it is too late.
New legislation must also make the taking of an endangered animal a Federal
offense.” Richard Nixon, State of the Union Message to the Congress on Natural
Resources and the Environment (Feb. 15, 1973) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4102 [http://perma.cc/3497-NM7V]); see
also S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 3 (1973), reprinted in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN
1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 302 (1982) [hereinafter ESA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY] (endorsing President Nixon’s State of the Union Message).
19.
ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 72 (statement of Rep.
Dingell); id. at 193 (listing the protection of threatened species and the
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stressed the importance of protecting species before they reached
endangered status.20
The House and Senate Reports also
stressed these two innovations as central to the legislation.21
Ultimately, the Endangered Species Act embraced both
innovations. It provides for species to be listed as either
endangered or threatened based on the immediacy of the threat
they face.22 The statute protects listed species in three ways.
First, it requires federal agencies to “seek to conserve” them while
exercising their powers and “insure” that their activities are not
Second, it provides for the
“likely to jeopardize” them.23
designation and protection of “critical habitat.”24 Third, to
protect those species facing the greatest threats, it imposes
criminal and civil penalties for “take” of endangered species—i.e.
any private activity that has an adverse effect on any member of
the species.25 The statute does not regulate private activities
regulation of private activity as the first and third most important innovations
of the Endangered Species Act).
20. See id. at 196–97 (statement of Rep. Goodling); id. at 201 (statement of
Rep. Leggett) (“[E]xisting law just does not provide the kind of management
tools we need to act early enough to save a vanishing species.”); id. at 202
(statement of Rep. Biaggi) (“Instead of merely protecting those species which are
now in danger . . . [w]e are including those species which, at some future date,
might become endangered.”); id. at 204 (statement of Rep. Clausen) (“The most
important feature of the bill is the provision extending protection to animals and
plants which may become endangered within the foreseeable future. In the past,
little action was taken until the situation became critical and the species was
dangerously close to total extinction.”); id. at 205 (statement of Rep. Gilman); id.
at 357 (statement of Sen. Tunney).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412 (1973), reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 141; S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 3, reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 18, at 302–03.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a (2012)); see 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (defining
“endangered” species); id. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened” species). See
generally Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:
Why Better Science Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029 (1997)
(describing the listing process).
23. 16 U.S.C. 1531(c)(1); id. § 1536; see Tenn.Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 174 (1978) (stating agencies must conserve species at all cost because
“Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priority”).
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3); see Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species
Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 296–314 (1993).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (providing civil and criminal penalties for violating
the take prohibition); see id. § 1532(19) (defining “take”); id. § 1538(a)
(prohibiting “take”); see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995) (upholding broad interpretation of take). See
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affecting threatened species.26 Instead, Congress delegated to the
Secretaries of Commerce and Interior the authority to adopt
regulations for threatened species if necessary and advisable to
provide for their conservation, including regulations prohibiting
take.27
III.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT DOES NOT
AUTHORIZE A BLANKET EXTENSION OF THE
TAKE PROHIBITION TO ALL THREATENED
SPECIES

Shortly after the statute was enacted, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service—the
agencies charged with implementing the statute—adopted a
regulation prohibiting any take of any threatened species unless
the Services adopt a more specific regulation for that species.28
The regulation applies prospectively to every species
subsequently listed as threatened.29
This blanket extension of the take prohibition has been
challenged only once, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon.30 Citizen groups, lumber
companies, and trade associations challenged the application of
the blanket prohibition to the northern spotted owl, protections
for which frustrated timber harvesting.31 Ultimately, the D.C.

generally Frederico M. Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibition Against
Takings in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live
with a Powerful Species Preservation Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 109 (1991).
26. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a).
27. Id. § 1533(d); see also id. § 1540 (providing penalties for violating
regulations adopted under the statute).
28. Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40
Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,414, 44,425 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17).
29. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & 4(d) Rule Litig.,
818 F. Supp. 2d 214, 229 (D.D.C. 2011); 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2015); cf. Sierra Club
v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 614–15 (8th Cir. 1985) (construing the blanket extension
to forbid the agency from allowing take of any threatened species unless
necessary to relieve population pressures on the ecosystem).
30. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
31. See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Lujan, 806 F.
Supp. 279, 282 (D.D.C. 1992).
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Circuit sustained the regulation.32
It found the statutory
language ambiguous, reasoning that “any threatened species”
does not necessarily mean “any one threatened species” as
opposed to “any or all threatened species.”33 It also reasoned that
the second sentence of Section 4(d)—which expressly authorizes
regulation of take of threatened species—could be a separate
grant of power from that in the first sentence, meaning its
restrictive language would not apply to a regulation prohibiting
take.34 Turning to the legislative history, the Court noted a
“conflict” between the Senate Report, which limits Section 4(d) to
species-specific regulations, and the House Report, which is
ambiguous.35 Finally, it criticized the challengers’ reliance on the
use of the singular in Section 4(d), noting that singular references
in statutory text include the plural and vice versa.36 In light of
this purported ambiguity, the court deferred to the Service’s
interpretation under Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.37
The D.C. Circuit’s rush to apply Chevron suffers from a
number of defects. First, the court’s determination that Section
4(d) is ambiguous is belied by the text, legislative history, and the
constitutional avoidance canon (an issue not presented to the
court). Second, Chevron deference is inappropriate because the
regulation adopted doesn’t purport to interpret the statute.38 In
adopting the regulation, the Services offered no reasoned basis for
their decision.39 Nor did they articulate any interpretation of
Section 4(d).40 The interpretation upheld in Sweet Home was
32. Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 8.
33. Id. at 6.
34. See id.
35. Id.; see ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 151, 307.
36. Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6–7.
37. Id. at 6. See generally Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (establishing a judicial test for reviewing an agency’s construction of
statute agency implements); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) (discussing
the judicial approach to agency deference).
38. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (explaining that the deference is to be
afforded to administrative interpretations adopted as legislative regulations
interpreting and implementing an ambiguous statutory scheme).
39. See Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments,
40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,413–15 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
17); cf. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
40. See Reclassification of the American Alligator, 40 Fed. Reg. at 44,414.
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first articulated during that litigation.41 Such interpretations are
entitled to, at most, Skidmore deference.42 But not even this is
available because the Service represented to Congress during the
debate over the statute that the power is limited to speciesspecific regulations.43 Agency flip-flops, particularly unexplained
ones, are not entitled to Skidmore deference.44 Finally, deference
is inappropriate because the power to regulate any private
activity that affects any threatened species for any or no reason is
exceedingly broad, with corresponding economic and political
significance. Thus this is the type of power that, if Congress
wished to grant it, would be announced in a clear statement.45 I
will address each of these issues in turn.
A. The Text
Section 4(d) provides, in relevant part, that:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species . . . the
Secretary shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species. The
Secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any
threatened species any act prohibited under section
1538(a)(1) . . . or section 1538(a)(2) . . . with respect to
endangered species.46

Devoid of context, “with respect to any threatened species”
could be construed to allow a blanket extension of the take
prohibition.47 However, ambiguity is not assessed by looking at a
word or phrase in isolation; the whole text, context, its placement
in the larger statutory scheme, and interpretive canons all play a
41. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)
(“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”).
42. See Bradley George Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory
Interpretations First Advanced in Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the
Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 460–66 (2013).
43. See infra notes 83–84.
44. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26,
160 (2000).
45. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2012).
47. See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,
6 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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role.48 In context, the text compels the conclusion that the
agencies’ authority is limited to species-specific take regulations.
First, when Congress wanted to refer to endangered or
threatened species as a category it did not use “any” in this way.
For example, Section 4(d) refers to particular threatened species
using “any.”49 On the other hand, the second sentence refers to
the protection of endangered species as a category by omitting
“any,” saying instead “with respect to endangered species.”50
Interestingly, when the D.C. Circuit attempted to distinguish the
power to adopt species-specific regulations from the power to
adopt categorical regulations, the phrasing it chose was precisely
that used in the statute.51 In finding ambiguity, the court
explained that it could not distinguish “any threatened species”
from “any or all threatened species.”52 However, in the D.C.
Circuit’s re-imagination of the statutory text, “any threatened
species” means a specific threatened species, just as it does in the
statute’s text.53
Second, the limitations on the authority set out in the first
sentence of Section 4(d) could not be satisfied by the blanket
extension of the take prohibition to all threatened species.
Although the D.C. Circuit held that the second sentence could be
48. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); see City of Arlington
v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1875 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
50. Id.
51. See Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6–7. The courts have routinely interpreted
“any” in similar statutory schemes, including environmental statutes, the same
way. The Clean Air Act, for instance, requires EPA to adopt regulations for
“emission of any air pollutant” from mobile sources, not pollutants generally. 42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). This provision has been construed as the power to
regulate particular pollutants. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
528–29 (2007).
52. See Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6 (adding “or all” to signify categorical
regulations).
53. See id. There is also evidence in the legislative history that Congress
was aware of the difference between these textual formulations. The Senate
Report, for example, construes “any threatened species” to limit the Services to
adopting species-specific regulations. S. REP. NO. 93-307 (1973), at 7–8 (1973),
reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 306–07. However,
when referring to the activities that could be regulated to protect a particular
species, it explained that the Services “‘may make any or all of the acts and
conduct defined as [“take”] . . . also prohibited acts as to the particular
threatened species.’” Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6 (emphasis added) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 93-307).
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construed as an independent grant of authority,54 this reading
must be rejected. The regulations adopted under the second
sentence are a logical subset of those addressed in the first. The
first sentence gives the agencies a broad authority to adopt any
kind of regulation when a species is listed as threatened, provided
that it is “necessary and advisable for the conservation of [the]
species.”55 A regulation prohibiting the take of any such species
is merely a specific example of the type of regulation that could be
adopted.
Although this reading would render the second sentence
superfluous, it is an understandable redundancy.56 Congress did
not take the decision to regulate private activity affecting
endangered species lightly but recognized the burdens this
regulation would have.57 A reasonable argument could be made
that Congress would not have conferred this great power to the
agencies without saying so.58 Thus, the second sentence’s specific
54. Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 6.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
56. Courts generally resist reading any statutory text to render any part of
it superfluous. E.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825,
837 (1988) (“As our cases have noted in the past, we are hesitant to adopt an
interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another
portion of that same law.”). However, “[s]urplusage does not always produce
ambiguity” and the preference against surplusage “is not absolute.” Lamie v.
U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004).
57. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 358 (statement of Sen.
Tunney).
58. The power to regulate any activity affecting any threatened species is a
great power indeed. It is, for instance, the power to regulate or forbid logging
throughout the country, housing development, and how water is used during
severe droughts. Given the vast economic and political significance of this
power, the first sentence, standing alone, would likely not satisfy the clear
statement rule articulated in Utility Air Regulatory Group. See Util. Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); see also Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”). The
scope of this power also raises significant constitutional concerns under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial
Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 377, 406 (2005); Jonathan Wood, A Federal Crime Against Nature: The
Federal Government Cannot Prohibit Harm to All Endangered Species Under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 29 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2015); cf.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
57 F. Supp. 3d 1337, 1342–46 (D. Utah 2014) (holding that FWS’ regulation of
take of “purely intrastate species” violates the Commerce Clause).
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authorization to extend the take prohibition on a species-byspecies basis is necessary to make clear that the agencies have
this authority.
Another textual clue that the power granted in the second
sentence is not independent of the first sentence’s limitations is
that when Congress authorized other types of regulations it gave
each its own statutory section and a standard to guide the
exercise of that power.59 For example, the next section, Section
4(e), authorizes the agencies to treat a look-alike species as
threatened or endangered to aid enforcement of the protections
for a listed species that it resembles.60 Although the standards
for the exercise of these authorities are lax—e.g., regulations
implementing the provisions for financial assistance to states
need only be “appropriate”61—they at least contain some
standard.
If the second sentence of Section 4(d) is an
independent authority, no standard guides its exercise.62
Consequently, the power articulated in the second sentence must
be a subset of that in the first sentence, and all of the first
sentence’s limitations apply to it.
These limitations foreclose any authority to adopt a blanket
extension. First, “whenever any species is listed” limits the
agencies to adopting regulations for species already listed.63
Prospective regulations of as yet unidentified species would be an
unreasonable interpretation of this language.64
Additionally, the agency could not know whether regulation
would be “necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation
of such species”65 until it is identified and listed. Under the
regulation, the Service never considers whether forbidding the

59. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) (authorizing “regulation of commerce or taking”
of look-alike species); id. § 1535(h) (authorizing regulations to aid in assisting
state conservation); id. § 1538(d)(3) (authorizing regulations governing imports
and exports).
60. Id. § 1533(e).
61. Id. § 1535(h).
62. See infra notes 88–104 and accompanying text.
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
64. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484–86 (2001) (no
deference to an agency’s unreasonable interpretation of a statute); see also
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (establishing that
courts will not uphold unreasonable agency interpretations).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
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take of a threatened species is “necessary and advisable.”
Although, at one time, this might not have seemed like much of a
difference, since the standard is so vague and capacious, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA suggests otherwise.
In that case, the Court held that, anytime Congress uses a
capacious standard to delegate rulemaking authority, the agency
must consider any and all relevant factors, especially the costs
and burdens associated with the regulation.66 The “necessary
and advisable” standard suggests that the agencies should at
least consider the costs and benefits of regulating the take of
threatened species to determine appropriateness.
Often, this standard may not be satisfied for a particular
species, either because the regulation’s impact on the species’
conservation is slight or because it would impose significant
burdens on individuals, property owners, or industry. In fact, the
Services seem to recognize as much in the several species-specific
regulations that pare back the blanket regulation’s application.67
For each, the agencies recognize that the blanket extension,
rather than being necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of that species, would be counterproductive.68 Thus,
one cannot say that prohibiting take of all threatened species is
necessary and advisable for their conservation across the board.69
66. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). In Michigan, the
Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of “appropriate and
necessary” in the Clean Air Act was unreasonable because it foreclosed any
consideration of costs. Id. at 2709.
67. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Revising the
Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,158, 46,159 (Aug. 2, 2012)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
68. See, e.g., id. In finding that less regulation better provides for the
conservation of a species, the Service implicitly acknowledges that going further
under the blanket extension would be counterproductive, at least for that
species.
69. That the Service occasionally departs from the blanket extension for
particular species does not serve as an after-the-fact correction of the problem
for two reasons. First, there is no indication that, for the great majority of
species subject to the blanket extension, the Services give any thought to
whether this burdensome regulation was necessary or advisable. See, e.g.,
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened
Status for the Washington, Oregon, and California Population of the Marbled
Murrelet, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,328, 45,337 (Oct. 1, 1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 17) (noting that, as a threatened species, the blanket take prohibition will
apply without discussing whether it is necessary and advisable for the
conservation of the Marbled Murrelet). Second, the agencies only reduce
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Finally, the statutory scheme counsels against a blanket
prohibition. Instead of looking at Section 4(d) in isolation, that
section should be interpreted in light of Congress’ decision to
expressly limit Section 9—the take prohibition—to endangered
species.70 Given that Congress rejected the idea of prohibiting all
take of any threatened species, it makes little sense to interpret
Section 4(d) to empower the Services to reverse that choice
immediately thereafter. When Congress wanted endangered and
threatened species to be treated the same—as it did when
regulating activities involving federal agencies—it said so
expressly.71
B. Legislative History
Legislative history reinforces this interpretation. Multiple
Congressmen and Senators acknowledged that the take
prohibition imposed significant burdens on affected individuals.72
Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the bill, explained that the
prohibition was limited to endangered species to “minimiz[e] the
use of the most stringent prohibitions. . . . Federal prohibitions
against taking must be absolutely enforced only for those species
on the brink of extinction.”73 Senator Stevens similarly described

regulatory burdens if that reduction satisfies the necessary and advisable
standard. See, e.g., Revising the Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 46,159. Regulatory burdens that are not necessary and advisable for the
conservation of a particular species, but not quite counterproductive—e.g., a
take regulation that has no appreciable effect on a species risk of extinction—
continue to be imposed.
70. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-412 (1973),
reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 154 (“Sec. 9. (a)
Subparagraphs (1) through (5) of this paragraph spell out a number of activities
which are specifically prohibited with respect to endangered (not threatened)
species . . . . It includes, in the broadest possible terms, restrictions on taking . . .
.”).
71. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536.
72. ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 358 (statement of Sen.
Tunney); see id. at 359 (describing the protections for endangered species as
“maximum protection for species on the brink of extinction”); id. at 360
(describing the Act as “absolute protection for species imminently in danger of
extinction”); id. (“I feel that this bill provides the necessary national protection
to severely endangered species while encouraging the States to utilize all of their
resources toward the furtherance of the purposes of this act.”).
73. Id. at 357 (statement of Sen. Tunney) (emphasis added).
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the prohibition as “stringent.”74 Yet Congress thought these
burdens had to be accepted in order to effectively protect species
in dire states.75
The Senate Report explicitly interprets Section 4(d) as
limited to species-specific regulations. It explains that the section:
requires the Secretary, once he has listed a species of fish or
wildlife as a threatened species, to issue regulations to protect
that species. Among other protective measures available, he may
make any or all of the acts and conduct defined as “prohibited
acts” . . . as to “endangered species” also prohibited acts as to the
particular threatened species.76

This confirms that the power to prohibit take is a subset of
the authority granted in the Section 4(d)’s first sentence.77 It
further makes clear that this authority is limited to prohibiting
the take of “particular threatened species.”78
In response to the Senate Report’s express endorsement of
the interpretation, the D.C. Circuit pointed to this language in
the House Report:
The Secretary is authorized to issue appropriate regulations to
protect endangered or threatened species; he may also make
specifically applicable any of the prohibitions with regard to
threatened species that have been listed in section 9(a) as are
prohibited with regard to endangered species. Once an animal is
on the threatened list, the Secretary has almost an infinite
number of options available to him with regard to the permitted
activities for those species. He may, for example, permit taking,
but not importation of such species, or he may choose to forbid
both taking and importation but allow the transportation of such
species.79

This language does not expressly endorse the power to adopt
a blanket prohibition. It is at most ambiguous—it could be
74. Id. at 370.
75. See generally id.
76. S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 8 (1973), reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 307 (emphasis added).
77. See id. (“Among other protective measures available . . . .”).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. H.R. REP. NO. 93-412 (1973), reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 18, at 151.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2

14

WOOD_PS_WD_FINAL_MACRO

2015]

12/16/2015 12:47 PM

TAKE IT TO THE LIMIT

37

interpreted to embrace a blanket authority, but need not be.80
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit relied on this piece of legislative
history to conclude that the legislative history is ambiguous
overall, and thus unhelpful in interpreting the statute.81 It did
not address other aspects of the House Report that suggest that
this authority was intended to be limited to species-specific
regulations.82
The bureaucrats who would ultimately be delegated this
authority also interpreted this authority as limited to speciesspecific regulations. Douglas P. Wheeler, the Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Interior, for example, told Congress that limiting
the take prohibition “assure[s] protection of all endangered
species commensurate with the threat to their continued
existence.”83 He went on to explain that any regulations adopted
under Section 4(d) would “depend on the circumstances of each
species.”84 Yet a mere two years later—after Congress granted it
the authority—the Department of Interior had an unexplained
change of heart about the meaning of Section 4(d).85

80. For instance, the power to make the take prohibition “specifically
applicable . . . with regard to threatened species” could mean that the
regulations adopted must be applicable to particular species. Id. (emphasis
added). Similarly, the last line’s reference to prohibiting take “of such species”
could be interpreted consistently with species-specific regulations. See id.
81. See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbit, 1 F.3d 1,
6 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
82. See H. REP. NO. 93-412, reprinted in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 18, at 151 (describing this as the authority to “make specifically applicable
any of the prohibitions with regard to threatened species” (emphasis added)); id.
at 154 (again referring to “specific[]” rather than general regulations).
83. Letter from Douglas P. Wheeler, Acting Assistant Secretary of the
Interior, to Rep. Leonor Sullivan, Chairman, House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries (Mar. 23, 1973), in ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
18, at 162; see also Letter from Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of Interior, to
Rep. Carl Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 1973), in
ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 18, at 160.
84. Letter from Douglas P. Wheeler, supra note 83 (emphasis added).
Wheeler went on to note that this power “could include a complete or partial ban
if deemed appropriate.” Id. In context, though, this refers to whether the take
prohibition would apply completely or only in part to a particular species.
85. See Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments,
40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,414 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
This change of heart casts further doubt on the agency’s reinterpretation. Cf.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 145–46, 155–56
(2000).
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C. Constitutional Avoidance
The interpretation required to sustain the blanket extension
also raises a potential constitutional problem. The only principle
in Section 4(d) to guide the Services’ exercise of this power is the
necessary and advisable standard contained in the first
sentence.86 If the second sentence is an independent power—as it
must be to sustain the Services’ power to adopt the blanket
prohibition87—there is no intelligible principle to guide its
exercise.
The nondelegation doctrine forbids Congress from delegating
power to administrative agencies without providing an
“intelligible principle” to guide its exercise.88 The failure to
provide an intelligible principle is particularly alarming here
because the power allegedly contained in the second sentence of
Section 4(d) is extremely broad. It would authorize the agencies
to forbid or exert regulatory control over any activity that affects
any threatened species, for any reason or no reason whatsoever.
No criteria would guide its exercise. The Services could forbid
private activity, or not, as they see fit. It would be difficult to
imagine a more obvious example of the delegation of legislative
power to administrative agencies.89
This asserted power is strikingly similar to that struck down
under the nondelegation doctrine in Panama Refining.90 In that
case, an oil company challenged an executive order adopted under
a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act that
authorized the President to prohibit interstate transportation of
petroleum.91
In holding that the provision violates the
86. 16 U.S.C. §1533(d) (2012).
87. See Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1,
6 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
88. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928) (delegation of power to an executive agency is constitutional so long as
Congress provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the agency’s exercise of
that power); see also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 529-32 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414–16 (1935).
89. “The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of
powers . . . .” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). It forbids
Congress from delegating its “legislative power” to any other branch. Id. at 371–
72; see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
90. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 414–19.
91. Id. at 406–07, 410–11.
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nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court stressed that the
statute “does not qualify the President’s authority”; “does not
state whether, or in what circumstances or under what
conditions, the President” was to regulate; “establishes no
criterion to govern” the exercise of that power; and “does not
require any finding by the President as a condition of his
action.”92 The statutory provision at issue in that case “declares
no policy” as to the regulation of interstate transportation of
petroleum.93 Rather, “it gives to the President an unlimited
authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition,
or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”94 Consequently, the
Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated the
legislative power to the President.95
Admittedly, courts have not declared a delegation
unconstitutional since 1935.96 However, this is because the
standard against which delegations are analyzed—intelligible
principle—is incredibly lax and easily satisfied so long as
Congress provides some principle to guide an agency’s decisionmaking.97 The Services’ and D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of
Section 4(d) would render it the rare exception. There is no
meaningful distinction between “[t]he Secretary may [prohibit
take]” and “[t]he President is authorized to [prohibit interstate
transportation of petroleum].”98 Neither provides any guidance
to how the Secretary or the President, respectively, is supposed to
exercise the delegated power.

92. Id. at 415.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 418–19, 433.
96. E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (“After
invalidating in 1935 two statutes as excessive delegations, we have upheld,
again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad
standards.” (internal citations omitted)).
97. Similarly, successful challenges to economic regulations under the Due
Process Clause have been exceedingly rare since the Supreme Court adopted the
rational basis test. See generally TIMOTHY M. SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A
LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 123–40 (2010). However, this does not
mean that, in the rare case that the government goes too far, courts will not
strike down unconstitutional laws. See, e.g., Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978,
991–92 (9th Cir. 2008); Bruner v. Zawacki, 997 F. Supp. 2d 691, 701 (E.D. Ky.
2014).
98. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 406.
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Although the Supreme Court has not struck down a statute
under this doctrine since 1935, it has repeatedly invoked it and
the avoidance canon when interpreting statutes that raise
Therefore, if Section 4(d) were
nondelegation questions.99
otherwise ambiguous, the Services’ interpretation must be
rejected to avoid interpreting the statute in a manner that raises
the nondelegation problem. Constitutional avoidance is an
interpretive canon that directs courts to interpret statutory
provisions so as to avoid calling their constitutionality into doubt,
if possible.100 Here, the nondelegation problem presented by the
D.C. Circuit’s interpretation in Sweet Home can be avoided by
construing the two sentences in Section 4(d) together, so that the
limits in the first sentence apply to any take regulations.101
Those limits would provide the required intelligible principle.102
They would also limit the power to adopting species-specific
regulations.103
D. Chevron is inapplicable
Finally, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Sweet Home is wrong
because Chevron deference does not apply to the agency’s

99. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 (“In recent years, our application of
the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of
statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to
statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”);
C. Boyden Gray, The Nondelegation Canon’s Neglected History and
Underestimated Legacy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 619, 622–26 (2015).
100. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012)
(“[I]t is well established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of
which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not
do so.”); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)
(Holmes, J., concurring); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448–49 (1830).
101. Cf. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(stating courts must adopt any “fairly possible” interpretation of a statute that
avoids a serious constitutional question).
102. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2012) (establishing “necessary and
advisable to provide for the conservation of such species” standard), with Touby
v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 163, 165–66 (1991) (holding “necessary to avoid
an imminent hazard to the public safety” an intelligible principle). Although
both provide ample policy-making authority to the agency, each provides at least
some guidance as to how such decisions should be made. Cf. Pan. Ref. Co., 293
U.S. at 415, 420.
103. See supra notes 54–69 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of Section 4(d). The foremost reason is that, as
explained above, the statutory text is not ambiguous, especially in
light of the constitutional avoidance canon.104 But there are two
additional reasons why the D.C. Circuit erred in applying
Chevron. First, the court did not have before it a regulation
interpreting the statute. The interpretation to which the court
deferred was articulated only as the Service’s litigation position
and was thus at most entitled to Skidmore deference.105 Second,
deference to this interpretation is inappropriate because a clear
statement rule applies to assertions of power of such vast
economic and political significance.106 This is particularly true
where, as here, the question is about one of the key reforms of the
statute.107
Chevron deference is improper because the Service offered no
interpretation of Section 4(d) in its regulation. In fact, the
Federal Register Notice announcing the regulation is silent as to
the standard governing its adoption or the basis for concluding
any such standard was satisfied.108 The regulation extended the
take prohibition to all threatened species without comment or
explanation.109 This failure to analyze the costs and burdens of
regulating take alone is sufficient to demonstrate that the
agencies’ interpretation of the statute is unreasonable.110
104. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007) (no deference
to an agency interpretation that runs counter to unambiguous statutory text).
105. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)
(“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”); see also United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (giving less deference to informal agency
interpretations, like amicus briefs (where the agency obviously is not a party to
the litigation) or informal guidance documents); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944) (explaining Skidmore deference as deference to the
extent the agency’s interpretation is persuasive).
106. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (“We
expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of
vast ‘economic and political significance.’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000))).
107. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015).
108. Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40
Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,414 (Sept. 26, 1975) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
109. See id. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the U.S. Supreme
Court held that agencies are required to engage in reasoned decision making,
i.e. to explain the basis for their decisions. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
110. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).

19

WOOD_PS_WD_FINAL_MACRO

42

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

12/16/2015 12:47 PM

[Vol. 33

The first time the agencies articulated an interpretation of
Section 4(d) that could sustain the blanket extension was in
Sweet Home.111 However, interpretations articulated for the first
time in briefing are not entitled to Chevron deference.112 At
most, they receive less permissive Skidmore deference.113
Assuming Skidmore deference is appropriate, the Services’
interpretation must nonetheless be rejected because (a) it is
inconsistent with the unambiguous statutory text114 and (b) it
conflicts with the agency’s representation to Congress when the
statute was being considered.115 The agency’s reversal is even
more damning in light of its failure to offer any reasoned
explanation for it.116 Consequently, the interpretation of Section
4(d) required to save the blanket extension does not qualify for
Skidmore deference.
The breadth of the asserted power provides a further reason
why deference is inappropriate. Recently, the Supreme Court
clarified that when Congress wants to allow agencies to make
111. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 6
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
112. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)
(“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”). There is a circuit split on
the question of whether an agency’s interpretation articulated as a litigant, as
opposed to as amicus, is entitled to any deference under Skidmore. See Hubbard,
supra note 42, at 460–66.
113. Hubbard, supra note 42, at 460–66. Skidmore deference is extremely
limited and has been criticized as deference only to the extent an interpretation
has the power to persuade, i.e. no deference at all. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 & n.6 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1302–03 (2007).
114. See supra notes 46–102 and accompanying text.
115. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 145–46,
155–56 (2000) (arguing Congressional testimony from FDA representatives that
they lacked authority to regulate cigarettes under the Food Drug and Cosmetics
Act undermined the agency’s later assertion of that authority); see also Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (“The weight of
deference afforded to agency interpretations under Skidmore depends upon . . .
‘its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements[.]’” (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
116. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 537 (2009)
(stating where an agency changes its policy, it must provide a reasoned
explanation for the change or its actions may be arbitrary and capricious); Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 48 (1983) (same).
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“decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance’” it must say
so clearly.117 Forbidding any activity that affects any threatened
species, including those that become so at any point in the future,
meets this standard. Presently, there are hundreds of animals
listed as threatened, most of which are subject to the blanket
extension of the take prohibition.118 However, nothing limits this
number from growing substantially.119 Protections for these
species can have severe economic and political consequences.120
Since Congress did not clearly say that the agencies had this
great power, it should not be assumed from an arguable
ambiguity.

117. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)
(quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).
118. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species Reports, ENVTL. CONSERVATION
ONLINE
SYS.,
http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/reports/ad-hoc-species-report?
kingdom=V&kingdom=I&status=E&status=T&status=EmE&status=EmT&stat
us=EXPE&status=EXPN&status=SAE&status=SAT&fcrithab=on&fstatus=on&
fspecrule=on&finvpop=on&fgroup=on&header=Listed+Animals
[http://perma.cc/EYU4-AV37].
119. This result is likely in light of the growth in “mega-petitions”—
petitions to add species to the list by the hundreds. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Listing Program Work Plan Questions and Answers (July 12, 2011),
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/FWS%20Listing%20Program%2
0Work%20Plan%20FAQs%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/TW3L-FTEM].
120. The total cost of species protection under the Endangered Species Act
is not known. The federal government reports only its costs of administering the
statute. See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE ENDANGERED
AND
THREATENED SPECIES EXPENDITURES: FISCAL YEAR 6 (2013),
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/2013.EXP.FINAL.pdf
[http://perma.cc/HTY7-HG5Y]; see also John R. Platt, How Much Did the U.S.
Spend on the Endangered Species Act in 2012?, Sci. Am. (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/extinction-countdown/2013/11/01/
endangered-species-act-2012/ [http://perma.cc/P7FW-UH28]. This figure grossly
underestimates the statute’s true cost because it ignores those borne by private
parties, especially opportunity costs. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, REBUILDING THE
ARK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM, 14–15 (Adler, ed.
2011); RANDY T. SIMMONS & KIMBERLY FROST, PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR.,
ACCOUNTING FOR SPECIES: THE TRUE COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(2004), http://perc.org/sites/default/files/esa_costs.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q3Z6TV3H]; Jonathan Wood, A Lesson in Logic; Or How to Honestly Evaluate
Government Policies, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (Nov. 4, 2013),
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/a-lesson-in-logic-or-how-to-honestly-evaluategovernment-policies/ [http://perma.cc/8233-KP54].
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THE STATUTE’S APPROACH WOULD MORE
FAIRLY DISTRIBUTE THE COSTS OF
PROTECTING THREATENED SPECIES

It makes sense that Congress would have treaded lightly in
regulating private activity to protect species. For those subject to
the regulation, the consequences are profound.121 Donald Barry
of the World Wildlife Fund once likened the statute to a pit bull
because it is “short, compact, and has a hell of a set of teeth.”122
Perhaps the sharpest of those teeth is the take prohibition.123
Property owners whose land provides habitat to species can see
their rights to use and enjoy their property extinguished entirely
once the species has been listed.124
Congress determined that these profound burdens placed on
a relatively few individuals are justified by the dire threats faced
by endangered species.125 An endangered species faces an
immediate risk of extinction, a consequence that is likely

121. See supra note 120.
122. Timothy Egan, Strongest U.S. Environment Law May Become
Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/
1992/05/26/us/strongest-us-environment-law-may-become-endangeredspecies.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/C9F8-VXB8].
123. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
124. See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered
Species Act and Private Property, 24 ENVTL. L. 369, 378–84 (1994). The Services
systematically underestimate these costs because they adopt a so-called
“baseline approach” which omits much of the burdens on private property
owners imposed under the act. See N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing the baseline
approach). Because the Service regulates take of most threatened species under
the blanket prohibition, it never gives any consideration to the necessity and
appropriateness of imposing these costs. See Jonathan Wood, PLF Comments on
Caribou Downlisting, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (June 26, 2014)
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2014/plf-comments-caribou-downlisting/
[http://perma.cc/5W5P-9C4L]. There is some evidence that property owners have
preemptively destroyed or degraded habitat to avoid the burdens of take and
habitat regulations. See, e.g., Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive
Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27, 51–
52 (2003); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION:
THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 355–56 (2014); Ronald Bailey,
“Shoot, Shovel, and Shut Up”: Celebrating 30 Years of Failing to Save
Endangered Species, REASON.COM (Dec. 31, 2003), http://reason.com/archives/
2003/12/31/shoot-shovel-and-shut-up [http://perma.cc/E4RR-M62D].
125. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/2

22

WOOD_PS_WD_FINAL_MACRO

2015]

12/16/2015 12:47 PM

TAKE IT TO THE LIMIT

45

irreversible.126 Threatened species facing more remote risks
require a different calculus and more caution before imposing
severe costs.127 The statute provides that the costs of this
proactive protection should be distributed across society as a
whole, by imposing burdens chiefly on federal agencies.128 Since
this extra level of protection benefits the public generally, it
makes sense that the costs would be borne by all too.129 Voiding
the blanket extension and returning to the statute’s approach to
protecting threatened species will thus lead to a fairer
distribution of the costs of providing this protection.
Of course, for some threatened species, efforts by government
agencies would not be enough. Regulating private activity to
protect them may be necessary.130 Congress could not have
known which threatened species would require this protection.
Thus, it delegated the power to identify these species to the
Services.131 However, if anything is clear from the statutory text,
Congress intended endangered and threatened species to be
treated differently, corresponding to the differing degrees of the
threats they face.132 Under the blanket regulation, however,
these categories receive essentially the same treatment.133
126. See Katherine M. Hausrath, Note, The Designation of “Distinct
Population Segments” Under The Endangered Species Act In Light Of National
Association of Homebuilders v. Norton, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 449, 479–80 (2005)
(discussing irreversibility and the precautionary approach); cf. Norman F.
Carlin et al., How to Permit Your Mammoth: Some Legal Implications of “Deextinction,” 33 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7–18 (2014) (discussing the possibility of
reviving an extinct species through cloning).
127. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text; cf. Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (describing the Takings Clause as barring
“Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”).
128. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1534–1537a (2012). Unlike the take prohibition, the
obligations imposed on federal agencies are the same with respect to protecting
threatened and endangered species. Id. § 1536. Ultimately, the costs of these
protections are spread across society as a whole, through taxes. Cf. Armstrong,
364 U.S. at 49.
129. The vast majority of protected species are found on private lands. See
ADLER, supra note 120, at 6–7.
130. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
131. 16 U.S.C. §1533(d).
132. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1533, with 16 U.S.C. § 1538; see also supra notes
722–755 and accompanying text.
133. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (2015); see also MIDWEST REGION, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENDANGERED AND
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A related salutary benefit of returning to the statutory
scheme is that it would encourage the agencies to develop
evidence on the burdens associated with regulating take. Under
Michigan v. EPA, they would have to identify and consider these
impacts when assessing whether regulation is necessary and
advisable.134 Through this process, we might finally develop
reliable estimates for these costs, which have long been unseen
and ignored.135
Ironically, the Services’ interpretation inverts the statutory
framework. The burdens imposed on individuals are only reduced
if necessary and appropriate for the conservation of the
species.136 According to current agency practice, the severity of
the imposition on individuals is given no consideration at any
point.137 This is unfair to those burdened by this regulation and
inconsistent with the recognition during the Congressional
debates that the statute’s stringent prohibition should be a last
resort.138

THREATENED? (2003), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/t-vs-e.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5X5W-MPZ5] (noting that a threatened listing includes all of
the same protections as endangered except the Service has the flexibility to
“scal[e] back” these protections if appropriate).
134. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
135. These costs are likely unseen because they are due to foregone
activity. The failure to identify and consider such costs is a common problem,
referred to as the broken window fallacy. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THAT WHICH IS
SEEN, AND THAT WHICH IS NOT SEEN (1850), reprinted in 51 IDEAS IN LIBERTY 12,
13 (2001).
136. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule
Revising the Special Rule for the Utah Prairie Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. 46,158, 46,159
(Aug. 2, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (deeming it necessary and
advisable to the conservation of the Utah prairie dog to relax the take
prohibition for that threatened species); Keith Saxe, Note, Regulated Taking of
Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 399,
425–438 (1988) (arguing that the Service has only limited authority to permit
take of threatened species, without observing that the Service’s approach has
flipped the statutory standard on its head).
137. See, e.g., Final Rule Revising the Special Rule for the Utah Prairie
Dog, 77 Fed. Reg. at 46,159.
138. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
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THE STATUTE’S APPROACH CREATES
BETTER INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE
CONSERVATION AND SPECIES RECOVERY

The statute’s presumption against the application of the take
prohibition to threatened species is also likely to redound to the
benefit of species. By treating endangered and threatened species
differently, the statute gives private landowners an incentive to
proactively minimize impacts on threatened species, to head off
an endangered listing, and recover endangered species, to enjoy
the benefits of a downlisting.139
The current punitive approach is likely counterproductive.
Due to the harsh burdens placed on those who own property
inhabited by protected species, there is a strong incentive to
eradicate the species or destroy its habitat before it is protected
or discovered by regulators.140 If the property owner allows her
property to remain suitable habitat—which one would expect to
be praiseworthy—she could ultimately lose the right to use her
property in the future, lest developing or using it results in
take.141 Consequently, property owners who otherwise might
have been willing to accommodate species conservation may have
little choice but to convert their property before it becomes
subject to regulation. This not only makes the property owner
worse off but also harms the very species the regulation is
supposed to protect.142
The government appears to be recognizing this problem. The
Fish and Wildlife Service recently proposed to rely more heavily
on proactive voluntary conservation as a preferred means of

139. See ADLER, supra note 120, at 16–18 (discussing the problem of the
take prohibition’s perverse incentives).
140. EPSTEIN, supra note 124, at 355–56; Bailey, supra note 124. See
generally Lueck & Michael, supra note 124.
141. See Jonathan Wood, PLF Asks Court to Rule on the Constitutionality
of Utah Prairie Dog Regulation, PAC. LEGAL FOUND. LIBERTY BLOG (Nov. 19,
2013),
http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2013/plf-asks-court-to-rule-on-theconstitutionality-of-utah-prairie-dog-regulation/ [http://perma.cc/E7MW-A4GR]
(arguing protection of the Utah prairie dog prevented people from farming and
protecting an airport and cemetery from a rodent infestation).
142. BRIAN SEASHOLES, REASON FOUND., FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE CASE FOR AN ENDANGERED SPECIES RESERVE
PROGRAM 22 (2014), http://reason.org/files/endangered_species_act_reform.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W2QN-44QB].
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protecting species. On July 22, 2014, the Service proposed a
policy to reward landowners who take preemptive measures to
conserve species prior to their listing.143 It takes advantage of
similar incentives using Candidate Conservation Agreements
with Assurances144 and Safe Harbor agreements.145 These
schemes recognize, if only implicitly, that the take prohibition’s
harshness is not the best way to encourage landowners to use
their private property to convey a public benefit like species
conservation. A preferable approach is to encourage landowners
to conserve species in order to avoid the harshness of the
prohibition.146
Returning to the scheme Congress created would better
encourage private conservation efforts in two ways. First, the
prospect of the take prohibition’s application if a species becomes
endangered is a big stick that property owners would do well to
avoid.147 Since this prohibition does not apply to threatened
species under the statutory scheme,148 property owners,
communities, and states whose lands contain threatened species
would have an incentive to protect them voluntarily—though in
ways less burdensome than the take prohibition—to avoid this
consequence.
Would this incentive be enough to overcome the risk that the
property owner might follow the “shoot, shovel, and shut up”
approach? Although we cannot know for sure, private
conservation efforts to avoid potential listings provide powerful
143. Policy Regarding Voluntary Prelisiting Conservation Actions, 79 Fed.
Reg. 42,525, 42,525 (July 22, 2014); see also News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., New Policy Proposed to Benefit At-Risk Wildlife, Provide Credits to
Landowners Taking Voluntary Conservation Actions (July 17, 2014), http://
www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/pdf/Prelisting%20policy%20news%20r
elease%20FINAL%20FORMATTED.pdf [http://perma.cc/UWH6-YDDH].
144. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
(2011), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf [http://perma.
cc/LJ5R-E8JE].
145. Safe Harbor Agreements: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endangered/landowners/landowners-faq.
html [http://perma.cc/3KKD-2LUE] (last updated July 15, 2013).
146. See Damien M. Schiff, The Endangered Species Act at 40: A Tale of
Radicalization, Politicization, Bureaucratization, and Senescence, 37 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 105, 128–31 (2014) (arguing that a compensatory, as
opposed to punitive, regime would better prioritize and protect species).
147. See ADLER, supra note 120, at 14–15.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012).
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evidence that it could be.149 Take the greater sage grouse. The
proposed listing of this species would affect eleven states and
approximately 165 million acres.150 The listing would threaten
agriculture, ranching, and, most significantly, oil and gas
To avoid these severe
development across the region.151
consequences, private landowners, industry, conservation groups,
local, state, and federal governments formed the Sage Grouse
Initiative, which facilitates private conservation efforts.152
Through this voluntary cooperation, 4.4 million acres of habitat
have been restored and over $400 million invested in the species’
conservation.153 The motivation behind the private cooperation
was clear: to ward off a listing and its consequences.154
Another example is the Fish and Wildlife Service’s recent
decision not to list the dunes sagebrush lizard in recognition of
voluntary state and private conservation efforts that ameliorated
149. Cf. Policy for Evaluation of Conservation Efforts When Making
Listing Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,100 (Mar. 28, 2003) (federal policy
encouraging state and private conservation efforts as an alternative to listing
species); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., PECE EVALUATION FOR THE NEW MEXICO
CCA/CCAA AND TEXAS CONSERVATION PLAN 39 (2012), http://www.fws.gov/
southwest/es/Documents/R2ES/DSL_PECE_NM_and_TX_06112012.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LV99-J3L5] (applying this policy to state plans to conserve the
dunes sagebrush lizard and noting that the affirmative conservation measures
achieved under them would not likely be achieved by a listing).
150. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,THE GREATER SAGE-GROUSE: FACTS,
FIGURES AND DISCUSSION, http://www.fws.gov/greatersagegrouse/factsheets/
GreaterSage GrouseCanon_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/685P-PUL4].
151. Reid Wilson, Western States Worry Decision on Bird’s Fate Could Cost
Billions in Development, WASH. POST (May 11, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/05/11/western-states-worry-decisionon-birds-fate-could-cost-billions-in-development/ [https://perma.cc/TL2N-RKSB];
see David Wilms & Anne Alexander, The North American Model of Wildlife
Conservation in Wyoming: Understanding It, Preserving It, and Funding Its
Future, 14 WYO. L. REV. 659, 689–90 (2014) (reporting that the listing would, in
Wyoming alone, threaten 4,000 jobs, $255 million in income, and $30 million in
state tax revenue).
152. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OUTCOMES IN CONSERVATION: SAGE GROUSE
INITIATIVE 1 (2005), http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/PA_NRCSConsumption/
download?cid=stelprdb1270408&ext=pdf [http://perma.cc/5GWJ-ZWZG].
153. Id.
154. Cf., e.g., Keith Ridler, Idaho Puts Forward Plan to Protect Sage
Grouse Habitat, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2015/feb/22/idaho-puts-forward-plan-to-protect-sage-grouse-hab/
[http://perma.cc/WV9D-939L] (quoting the Director of the Idaho Department of
Lands, which put forward a conservation plan, as explaining “[i]t’s a balance . . .
but we think in the long run avoiding a listing is a good thing”).
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the threats to that species.155 In 2010, the Service proposed
listing the lizard as an endangered species, a decision that would
significantly restrict land use and oil and gas extraction in
Texas.156 To avoid these significant consequences, the State
worked with property owners, industry, and biologists to develop
a plan to develop higher quality data on the species’ status and
encourage voluntary conservation, without the dire costs that
would be incurred if listed.157 So far, more than two hundred
thousand acres of dunes sagebrush lizard habitat have been
enrolled for conservation.158
These examples demonstrate that avoiding the severe
burdens associated with the take prohibition can be a powerful
incentive to spur private actions that benefit species. If
governments, landowners, and industry will go to such lengths to
avoid a listing under the current regime, it stands to reason that
they would also do so to avoid a species declining to the point of
being endangered, if the statutory scheme was restored.
If this incentive falls short for a particular species, the
statutory scheme adequately addresses that concern. First, and
most obviously, if a species continues to decline, it can be listed as
endangered and the take prohibition will apply with full force.159
Alternatively, the Service may craft a species-specific
regulation—provided that it is necessary and advisable for the
conservation of that species—to regulate bad actors, particular
types of take or all take of the threatened species.160
The blanket prohibition against takes of threatened species
undermines a second important incentive for private
conservation—the prospect of a downlisting. Under the statute, a
155. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the
Proposed Rule to List Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,872, 36,884–99
(June 19, 2012).
156. See id. at 36,872, 36,885.
157. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., TEXAS CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE
DUNES SAGEBRUSH LIZARD 1–2 (2011); Brian Seasholes, A Big Win for
Endangered Species, Texas and Real Conservation: A Big Loss for Lawsuitbased Conservation, REASON FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://reason.org/blog/show/abig-win-for-endangered-species-an [http://perma.cc/Y3BC-R3Q8]; see also Defs.
of Wildlife v. Jewell, 70 F. Supp. 3d 183, 199 (D.D.C. 2014) (upholding the
Service’s decision not to list the dunes sagebrush lizard).
158. Seasholes, supra note 157.
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012).
160. Id. § 1533(d).
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species’ improvement from endangered to threatened should be a
cause for celebration amongst affected landowners. The lifting of
the take prohibition rewards them for their role in a species’
recovery. Under current agency practice, on the other hand, the
distinction between endangered and threatened is superficial.161
The only beneficiaries are the agencies, which claim greater
discretion and power in the case of threatened species.
The blanket regulation’s misincentives may partially explain
why the Endangered Species Act has not been the effective
species recovery tool that its proponents hoped. In the forty years
since it was enacted, approximately one percent of the species
subject to its protections have recovered.162 A similar amount
have been delisted because they were improperly listed in the
first place or have become extinct, notwithstanding the statute’s
protections.163 Although many conservation groups describe the
statute as a success because relatively few species have gone
extinct since its adoption,164 it is difficult to square this metric
with the statute’s goals. Congress’ aim in adopting the
Endangered Species Act was not to create a regime under which
species at risk of extinction would remain forever on the
precipice. To the contrary, the intent was to conserve and recover
species.165 Incentivizing private conservation is the best means
of accomplishing that aim. The agencies’ command-and-control
approach gets the incentives wrong: it severely punishes those
161. See Patricia Sagastume, Reclassifying Florida Manatees: From
Endangered to Threatened, AL JAZEERA AM. (Aug. 8, 2014 5:00 AM)
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/8/8/reclassifyingfloridamanatees.html [http://perma.cc/E7DN-XJY4] (quoting Chuck Underwood,
a Fish and Wildlife Service spokesman, as saying that “[p]eople have
misperceptions that we have two lists. It’s one classification. Being endangered
or threatened relates to whether a species is moving toward extinction or not.”).
162. ADLER, supra note 120, at 9–10; M. LYNNE CORN & KRISTINA
ALEXANDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42945, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
(ESA) IN THE 113TH CONGRESS: NEW AND RECURRING ISSUES 2, 6 (2014).
163. CORN & ALEXANDER, supra note 162, at 6.
164. See generally KIEREN SUCKLING ET AL., CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,
ON TIME, ON TARGET: HOW THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT IS SAVING AMERICA’S
WILDLIFE (2012), http://www.esasuccess.org/pdfs/110_REPORT.pdf [http://
perma.cc/XP5C-HAXY]; DEFS. OF WILDLIFE, ASSAULT ON WILDLIFE: THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT UNDER ATTACK (2011), http://www.defenders.org/
publication/assault-wildlife-endangered-species-act-under-attack.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E83F-RMST].
165. See ADLER, supra note 120, at 9–10.
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who have maintained their property in a suitable condition for
imperiled species, and it denies landowners any reward for their
role in restoring a species to the point where the extinction risk is
more remote.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Services’ reversal of Congress’ decision to regulate
private activity to protect only endangered species was incorrectly
upheld by the only court to consider that question. Many of the
reasons why that decision was incorrect were not presented to the
court. The interpretation necessary to save the regulation
extending the take prohibition to all threatened species is
inconsistent with the statute’s text, legislative history, and the
constitutional avoidance canon. More recent Supreme Court
decisions cast the regulation into even further doubt.
Restoring the statutory scheme would have two laudatory
benefits. First, it would be fairer. The costs of providing
prophylactic protections to threatened species would fall on the
government and, ultimately, society as a whole rather than a
relatively few individuals. Second, it could reverse the perverse
incentives that currently prevail under the take prohibition.
Generally, leaving take of threatened species unregulated would
give property owners an incentive to stop their slide towards
endangered status, to avoid being subject to the take prohibition,
and recover endangered species so that they may be downlisted
and the take prohibition lifted. The Agencies’ approach, on the
other hand, deprives these categories of significance by treating
endangered and threatened species the same.
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